This paper revisits the issue of the productivity performance of preWorld War I Britain's railway system with an improved dataset and with modern time-series econometrics. We find a slowdown in TFP growth between 1850 and 1870, after which it stabilized at about 1.1%. An analysis of company-level productivity rejects the claims that there was a regulation-induced revival of productivity performance in the railway sector after 1900 but, on the other hand, it supports the claim that there was some managerial failure during the period.
Introduction
A generation ago it was commonplace to allege that late nineteenth century Britain experienced 'entrepreneurial failure' and a climacteric in productivity growth (Landes, 1969; Saul, 1968) . Now these claims are much more muted or nuanced as it has been recognised that the quantitative evidence offers relatively little support for them (Crafts, 2004a) . In particular, the suggestion originally made by Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones (1952) that the climacteric resulted from the exhaustion of steam as a General Purpose Technology has been rejected (Crafts and Mills, 2004) .
However, railways have not received the exoneration that has been given to most other sectors of the economy and the quality of their management and their productivity performance are still seen as, at best, improve productivity with a view to reassuring shareholders. Thus, in his view, tightened regulation after 1900 acted as an antidote to principalagent problems in large companies where ownership was separated from control. Even then, however, management was distracted by lobbying of government with a view to being able to solve their problems through mergers.
The principal evidence considered by Arnold and McCartney, Cain, and Irving relates to financial returns, which reflect but do not equate to productivity performance. Trends in railway productivity are central to these judgments of performance. Aldcroft's account of productivity trends was based on a measure of labour productivity derived from Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones (1952) which has subsequently been discredited. In fact, the data available to construct productivity indices are problematic in several respects. The first serious attempt to measure total factor productivity (TFP) growth was made by Hawke (1970) . His estimates were later refined and extended from 1890 to 1910 by Foreman-Peck (1991) .
The Edwardian period was subjected to detailed scrutiny by Dodgson (1993) , who constructed TFP growth estimates for each of 14 major railway companies.
Although the series that have been used for capital stock, employment and output at the national level all have serious weaknesses, and trends in the TFP estimates have never been analysed using modern time-series econometrics, the most recent overview has used the productivity evidence to re-assert a highly-critical view of railway management and to resist the suggestion that tighter regulation led to better productivity performance after 1900. Foreman-Peck and Millward state that "total factor productivity growth ... declined continuously after 1870 becoming negative in the Edwardian period", "the total factor productivity results are not consistent with an Edwardian recovery in 3 railway performance", and "organization and customs that had been appropriate to one epoch of railway technology persisted when opportunities and challenges changed. Inertia was encouraged by an absence of competition ..." (1994, p. 88, 89, 90) . Dodgson found substantial differences in productivity performance across his sample of companies and concluded that there was a "failure of Edwardian railway regulation" (1993, p. 176) .
In this paper, we construct a new TFP index for Britain's railways, drawing heavily on unpublished estimates of the net capital stock and expenditures on wages in 30 major railway companies made by Brian
Mitchell and based on revised estimates for the transport of freight. We use this index to conduct an econometric analysis of each of capital, labour and total factor productivity. We also examine the performance of individual railway companies for the period 1893-1912 for which adequate data are available and attempt to measure this on a basis as consistent as possible with our national estimates. This permits further insights into the impact of regulation as well as providing a perspective on the evaluations in the literature of various companies' performance.
In particular, we address the following specific questions:
1)
What was the chronology of TFP growth in Britain's railways prior to World War I?
2) Does the evidence on productivity performance support the claim that regulation had a favourable impact after 1900 but not before?
A New Total Factor Productivity Index
This section describes and presents our new TFP index and its components for the British railway system prior to World War I. We then 4 go on to compare the results with the earlier estimates made by Dodgson (1993) , Hawke (1970) and Foreman-Peck (1991) .
Estimates of railway output growth present serious difficulties.
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Ideally, in common with Dodgson (1993) , we would like to create an index based on revenue-weighted estimates of passenger-miles and freight tonmiles, with the latter distinguishing between minerals, which generated very low receipts, and merchandise. Following Dodgson (1993) , we use passenger train miles taken from the Railway Returns. This source also gives data on revenue for each of these types of output, and thus permits calculation of the required revenue shares, and for tons of minerals and merchandise carried. 2 As Dodgson points out, distinguishing between minerals and general merchandise matters because the latter was a declining proportion of traffic, and failure to separate out these two types of freight appears to be a serious weakness in Foreman-Peck's estimates besides making them non-comparable with those of Dodgson.
For freight, the problem comes in calculating ton-miles, which requires an estimate of the average length of haul, and it is here that the major differences with previous studies lie. We have based our estimates of haul length for 1871 to 1912 on estimates for receipts per ton-mile for different types of freight given by Paish (1902) . He found that the most common estimate for these in the companies that he studied was 0.7d for minerals and 2.0d for merchandise in 1900, and he reported that these rates were also typical of the whole period 1880 to 1900 for the largest The resulting estimates for haul length are shown in Table 1 , where the earlier estimates of Cain (1988) and Hawke (1970) are also reported, together with the implied average receipts per ton-mile for all freight. Our procedures seem to be consistent with more of the available evidence than either of these earlier writers. In particular, the following points should be noted. First, the estimates are similar to those of Cain (1988) for the post-3 Cain (1980) suggests that rates fell after 1900 based on the detailed statistics for the North Eastern Railway Company presented in Irving (1976) . If these reductions were typical of other companies, then by 1911 receipts for minerals would have fallen to 0.69d and for merchandise to 1.90d per ton-mile. Incorporating this adjustment would only add about 2 per cent to the increase in total output between 1900 and 1912.
6 1870 period but are more solidly grounded in explicit assumptions about receipts for different classes of freight. Second, unlike Cain (1988) , and following him Foreman-Peck (1991), they also explicitly distinguish between minerals and merchandise, which matters given the changing composition of traffic and the much higher charges for the latter category.
Third, the estimates for minerals haul in 1865 and average haul for 1900
are very similar to those in Hawke (1970) and Paish (1902) respectively. 4 Fourth, the rising haul lengths suggested by Hawke (1970) after 1871 are clearly implausible because they imply big falls in average receipts and are inconsistent with the data in Paish (1902) . Fifth, the decline in mineral hauls after the mid-1870s reflects the growing competition from coastal shipping on long hauls and is epitomized by a declining share of London's coal traffic (Armstrong, 1987) . Sixth, the implied receipts for 1852 are a bit lower than the estimate of Lardner (1855) Hawke (1970, p.262 ) to obtain estimates for 1852 to 1860, 1873 and 1884, and also have estimates for 1898 , 1901 , 1904 , 1907 and 1910 from Munby and Watson (1978 . We have interpolated between these years 4 The data in Paish (1902) imply an average haul length of 26.4 miles according to Cain (1980, p. 12) . 5 Foreman-Peck and Hawke use weights of 0.73, 0.23 and 0.04. The difference in weighting makes no material difference. Mitchell's worksheets were complied from the accounts of 30 major railway companies and formed the basis of his estimates of capital formation which appeared in Mitchell (1964) . 6 30 years for rolling stock and 100 years for permanent way and works.
using the annual estimates of expenditure on wages and salaries in
Mitchell's worksheets. For coal, we have linearly interpolated between the years where coal consumption is known and reported in Mitchell (1988) . 7 We report the annual series that are obtained as the first three columns of Table 2 , while TFI is in column 4.
We believe that the annual series for capital and labour inputs are superior to those used previously and they are actually the first on an annual basis for . With regard to the growth of capital inputs, our estimates are very similar indeed to those of Hawke (1970) Mitchell (1964) . With regard to employment, Hawke (1970) used a regression to extrapolate from the known data points but this does not seem to fit particularly well, while Foreman-Peck (1991) adds to these estimates only at 10-yearly intervals, apparently using similar sources to us. Differences between the three sets of estimates in the long run trends of employment growth are, however, not very great.
In Table 3 we present our index of TFP and the series of labour and capital productivity. Table 4 displays endpoint calculations for each decade of rates of growth of output, TFI and TFP and also of labour productivity, in order to get an initial sense of the timing of any deceleration in productivity growth and to highlight the differences between our estimates and those of earlier writers.
Our estimates do suggest a decrease in TFP growth from the 1850s through each decade to the 1880s, with a modest recovery after 1900.
Over the whole period from 1852 to 1912 labour productivity increases by 7 These years are 1855, 1869, 1887, 1903 and 1913 . This is obviously a crude procedure but the weight on coal is so small that any bias must be trivial. 
Modeling Trend Growth Rates
In this section, we model the time series for output, capital and labor productivity and TFP with the aim of estimating their trend rates of growth.
The general framework that we employ is to suppose that an observed time series can be decomposed as
with the objective being to use the data on to estimate the unobserved component series and , which may be taken to represent 'signal plus noise'. Models for the components may be defined within the setup of the basic structural model (BSM), which has been used in previous studies of
output growth by Crafts, Leybourne and Mill (1989) and Mills (1994, 1996) . This assumes that the signal is the sum of trend and cycle components, i.e., . The trend, , follows a random walk with a stochastic slope, which also follows a random walk:
Generally, the cyclical component, , is formulated as a stochastic combination of sine and cosine waves, but for the data being analysed here, it was found that a simpler first order auto-regression is appropriate: If, however, just , then the trend becomes
which is an integrated random walk and is often referred to as the 'smooth trend' model, since fitted models of this type often produce a signal that is relatively smooth. The BSM can be fitted and the components estimated where it is seen that trend growth fell from 3% per annum at the start of the 1850s to 1.5% by the beginning of the 1880s, after which it stabilized at this value until the end of the sample. Figure 7 , where it is seen that trend growth fell from 2.3% per annum in the 1850s to 1.1% by the beginning of the 1880s, after which it stabilised at this value until the end of the sample.
n summary, trend output growth declines throughout the period from 6.5% to 1.3% per annum, except for the 1880s and 1890s, where it remained fairly constant at around 2.5%. Trend labour productivity was constant throughout the period, so that trend growth is absent. Capital productivity and TFP trend growth both fell consistently until the early 1880s, after which both stabilized for the rest of the period at 1.5% and 1.1% per annum respectively.
The implications of these results are as follows. First, continuing growth in capital productivity throughout the period suggests that Irving
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(1978) was right to argue that claims that railway managers indulged in a spree of wasteful investment projects are mistaken. Second, there is a recovery in labour productivity after 1900, which the econometric evidence might suggest could be seen as an 'error correction'. This is consistent with the improvement in operating practices at that time noted by both Cain (1988) and Irving (1978) . Third, trend growth in TFP is better than a reader of Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) would suppose, since it stabilizes in the early 1880s at 1.1% per year. On the other hand, these authors are right to say that there is no increase in TFP growth in the Edwardian period and it turns out that the apparent improvement shown by the endpoints calculation in Table 4 is misleading. There is no support in this analysis for a suggestion that tighter regulation led to faster TFP growth after 1890.
TFP Growth in 14 Railway Companies
The major source of the data available to analyze TFP growth at the company level is the Railway Returns, published, annually, by the Board of Trade. With respect to output, the Returns provide data for each company on passenger train miles, merchandise tons, mineral tons, and revenue from each of the three types of output, which are used for the calculation of the required shares to derive total output. We converted each category of freight tons to ton miles in the same manner as we did for the aggregate analysis, i.e. using Paish's (1902) rate per ton mile figures of 0.7d and 2d
for minerals and merchandise freight, respectively. As noted in section 2, receipts per ton-mile were falling after 1900, so this will bias output and TFP growth down slightly. Various sources are used to construct the growth rates of TFI.
Following Dodgson (1993) we proxy capital input by total route miles which are provided in the Railway Returns. The same source provides data on annual expenditures on wages and coal, which we use to estimate, respectively, employment and fuel use by deflating using a price index.
We used the Board of Trade wage index, based on average weekly earnings for 20 British railway companies, which goes back to 1898 and is given in Munby and Watson (1978, p. 58) . We extended this back to 1893- The results reported in Table 5 show an average TFP growth between 1893 and 1912 of 0.7% per year, with 1900 to 1912 slightly lower at 0.6%, which is slightly above the average of 0.4% that Dodgson (1993) found for the latter period. Average TFP growth is lower than in our national estimates (Table 4 ) and this comes from faster growth of TFI after 1900. Clearly, the national estimates are to be preferred since they derive from estimates of the capital stock rather than route miles and are anchored by estimates of employment rather than relying entirely on deflating the wage bill by an imperfect measure of wage rates. The value alternative does not make any material difference with regard to any of the main points developed in this section.
of Table 5 is in the information that it conveys about the dispersion of productivity performance.
The estimates in Table 5 
The results in Table 5 Gourvish (1978) that the much-maligned Edward Watkin and James Forbes left their companies in a position to participate fully in a move to greater efficiency in the new century.
Discussion
While the Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones (1952) economy in this period of a little under 0.5% per year (Feinstein et al., 1982) . This suggests that pessimism about productivity performance on the railways should be kept in perspective.
Nevertheless, it seems that the exoneration of the late Victorian and
Edwardian economy from the allegation of entrepreneurial failure announced by new economic historians (McCloskey and Sandberg, 1971) is problematic in the case of railways. Not only were there examples of seriously misconceived investment projects such as the Great Central Railway's London extension but, at the company level, there are big disparities in productivity performance. Mulatu and Crafts (2004) find a wide range of efficiency scores in the 1890s with no tendency for this to narrow in the Edwardian period and, in this context, the failure of the laggards to catch up the leaders through faster TFP growth is disappointing. The general argument stressed by McCloskey and Sandberg was that competition punished firms that failed to perform well.
But, while this argument has general appeal, it does not really apply to the railway sector, in which barriers to entry were massive and tacit collusion was apparent (Cain, 1988) . Across the whole industry, the absence of competition could be expected to lead to poor productivity performance in companies that lacked a dominant external shareholder (Nickell, 1996) .
And as Arnold and McCartney (2005) argue this would imply excessive costs and weak profitability in the railway system.
This highlights the potential importance of regulation as a spur to productivity improvement, as is strongly suggested by the experience of privatization of public utilities in the UK (Parker, 2004 ). Yet, although regulatory constraints may have played a role of this kind after 1900, as Cain (1988) claimed, the incentives given to greater efficiency were quite
weak compared with what could have been introduced through pricecapping plus yardstick competition. The regulatory regime did not explicitly penalize under-performance and the squeeze imposed by frozen charges was quite modest in the low inflation environment of the Gold Standard.
Conclusions
We posed two explicit questions at the outset. Our answers are as follows.
First, on the basis of our new TFP index for British railways and a time-series analysis of its properties, we conclude that labour productivity was stationary over the long run while trend TFP growth fell steadily from a little under 2.5% per year in the 1850s to about 1.1% per year in the early 1880s, at which rate it continued without any further decline till World War I.
Second, we believe that the record of productivity performance at the company level suggests that regulation did not have any significant positive impact after 1900. The absence of any catching-up by companies with relatively low initial levels of efficiency suggests a failure of railway regulation in this era. No doubt it would be anachronistic to have expected regulation to have been better designed but, in a sector where competition was quite weak, the upshot was that incumbent management was allowed a good deal of scope to be sleepy. Sources: derived from Hawke (1970 ), Cain (1988 and see text for present study. Sources: derived from Foreman-Peck (1991), Hawke (1970) , and Tables 2 and 3 . Source: see Appendix.
Notes: Output consists of passenger train miles, mineral ton miles and merchandise ton miles weighted by the revenue shares in 1882 for Britain's railways as a whole. These weights are 0.43, 0.25 and 0.32, respectively. We have also experimented with the average revenue shares derived from the sample of the 14 companies alone. The results obtained are similar. TFI consists of capital, labour and coal weighted by the average cost shares in 1882 for Britain's railways as a whole. These weights are 0.63, 0.34 and 0.03, respectively. We have also experimented with four inputs including iron & steel average and the average cost shares derived from the sample of the 14 companies alone. The results obtained are similar. The average figures in the last row are weighted by average total route miles. 
